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1 INTRODUCTION
The present paper provides an introductory summary of some materials taken
from Ichiishi and Yamazaki (2002), asurvey paper on the Bayesian cooper-
ative game theory.
The Bayesian cooperative game theory provides foundations of analysis of
an economy with organizations as production units, in particular analysis of
resource allocation mechanisms instituted in organizations as superior alter-
natives to the market mechanism. Firms (organizations) in the present-day
bee societies are interdependent, so we emphasize ageneral game-theoretical
model in which the feasib ihty and implications of coordinated strategy choice
within acoalition are influenced by the outsiders’ strategy choice.
While the conventional noncooperative Bayesian analyses sometimes have
assumed the presence of amediator for the firm activities, there is no need
for amediator in the cooperative Bayesian analysis. Indeed, in reality, cor-
porations are operated without consulting with amediator; the manager$\mathrm{s}$
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at various levels of corporate hierarchy are not mediators but players in a
coalition pursuing their own interests.
The first part (section 2) provides the key ingredients. After formulating
the basic one-shot model, which synthesizes Harsanyi’s (1967/1968) Bayesian
game and Aumann and Peleg’s (1960) non-side-payment game (NTU game),
and illustrating economic examples, two conditions that an endogenously
determined strategy is required to satisfy are discussed: measurability with
respect to an information structure, and Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Several descriptive solution concepts that have been proposed to date are
discussed.
The second part (section 3) addresses two of the issues studied in the lit-
erature. The first issue is the existence of the descriptive solutions. The sec-
ond issue is explanation of information revelation, that is, aprocess through
which private information turns into public information. Two approaches
have been taken in the past. One approach explains it as aconsequence of
taking actions, and the other approach explains it as credible information-
transmission at the contract negotiation (e.g., credible talk). The former
approach is classified into two more specific approaches: information revela-
tion by actions during the contract execution, and information revelation by
choosing an $inter\dot{v}m$ contract.
2Basic Ingredients
2-1 One-shot model
We construct general one-shot model appropriate for analyzing cooperative
behavior in an environment in which the players are endowed with differenti-
ated information (private information). The required model needs to embody
both Harsanyi’s Bayesian game and Aumann and Peleg’s non-side-payment
game ($\mathrm{N}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{U}$ game). We start fixing basic notation.
$N$:finite set of players.
$N$ $:=2^{N}\backslash \{\emptyset\}$ :nonempty coaltions.
$C^{j}$ : choice set (action set).
$T^{j}$ :finite type set.
$C^{S}:= \prod_{j\in S}C^{j}$ , $T^{S}:= \prod_{j\in S}T^{\mathrm{j}}$ , $C:=C^{N}$ , $T:=T^{N}$ .
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$u^{j}$ : $C\cross Tarrow \mathrm{R}$ :typesprofile-dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilty function.
The $ex$ ante period is defined as the period in which the players do not
have their private information yet, that is, they do not know their own types
yet, but have probabilities on the type-profile space, subjective or objective.
The interim period (or in mediis period) is the period in which each player
has his private information, that is, he knows his own type, but does not
know the others’ types. The $ex$ post period is the period in which every
player knows the exact realized type profile.
Let $\pi^{\mathrm{j}}(\cdot|t^{j})$ be the probability on $T^{N\backslash \{j\}}$ that player $j$ has in the interim
period, given his type $t^{j}$ . If he has an $ex$ ante probability $\pi^{j}$ on $T$ , the interim
probability is derived from it by the Bayes’ rule,
$\pi^{j}(t^{N\backslash \{j\}}|t^{j})=\frac{\pi^{j}(t^{N\backslash \{j\}},t^{j})}{\pi^{j}(T^{N\backslash \{j\}}\cross\{t^{j}\})}$.
DEFINITION 2.1.1 (Harsanyi, 1967/1968) ABayesian game is alist
of specified data, $\{C^{j}, T^{j}, u^{j}, \{\pi^{j}(\cdot|t^{j})\}_{t}j\in Tj\}j\in N$ .
An information structure is an algebra $A$ on $T$ . Let $\mathcal{T}^{S}$ be the information
structure generated by the events, $\{t^{S}\}\cross T^{N\backslash S}$ , $t^{S}\in T^{S}$ . Player $j’ \mathrm{s}$ private
information structure is then given a $\mathcal{T}^{j}:=\mathcal{T}^{\{j\}}$ . Notice that afunction on
$T$ is $\mathcal{T}^{S}$ -measurable, iff it is afunction only of $t^{S}$ .
For sensible analyses of the workings of asociety in which coopera-
tive behavior takes place, we need to introduce the feasibility concept: Let
$\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}(t)(\subset C^{S})$ be the set of feasible joint choices that coalition $S$ can make
when the type profile is $t$ . Notice that
$\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}(t)$ $\neq$
$\prod_{j\in S}\mathrm{C}_{0}^{j}(t)$
if $\# S$ $\geq 2$ ,
$\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}(t)$ $\neq$ $\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}(t’)$ if $t\neq t’$ .
Complete infomation is defined as the situation in which there is no
private information, that is, $\# T$ $=1$ ;in this situation, notation $t$ may be
suppressed. In the complete information case, if each player’s utility depends
only on his choice, that is, if $u^{j}(c)=u^{j}(\dot{d})$ , then the set of utility allocations
attainable in coalition $S$ is the set,
$V(S):=\{u\in \mathrm{R}^{N}|\exists c^{S}\in \mathrm{C}_{0}^{S} : \forall j\in S : u_{j}\leq u^{j}(\dot{d})\}$ .
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Set $V(S)$ is acylinder, based on asubset of $\mathrm{R}^{S}$ .
DEFINITION 2.1-2 (Aumann and Peleg, 1960) Anon-side-pa yment
game is acorrespondence $V$ ffom $N$ to $\mathrm{R}^{N}$ , such that [$u,$ $v\in \mathrm{R}^{N}$ , $\forall j\in S$ :
$u_{j}=v_{j}]$ implies [$u$ $\in V(S)$ iff $v\in V(S)$].
Player $j’ \mathrm{s}$ strategy $x^{j}$ : $Tarrow C^{j}$ is aplan of his choices contingent upon
type profiles. Define
$X^{j}:=\{x^{j} : Tarrow C^{\mathrm{j}}\}$ , strategy space.
$X^{S}:= \prod_{j\in S}X^{j}$ , $X:=X^{N}$ .
When the members of coalition $S$ jointly choose their strategies, their set
of feasible strategies may be constrained by the outsiders’ strategy choice.
This fact is described by the feasible-strategy correspondence $F^{S}$ : $Xarrow$, $X^{S}$ .
Clearly, for each $\overline{x}\in X$ ,
$F^{S}(\overline{x})\subset$ { $\mathcal{T}^{S}$-meaeurable selections of $\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}$ }.
Many of the works on Bayesian cooperative games done to date assume the
objective $ex$ ante probability $\pi$ on the type profile space.
DEFINITION 2.1-3 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) ABayesian society is
a1st of specified data
$S$ $:=(\{C^{j},T^{\mathrm{j}},u^{\mathrm{j}}\}_{j\in N}, \{\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}, F^{S}\}_{S\in N}, \pi)$ .
In his pioneering paper, Wilson paid particular attention to the informa-
tion that each player can use at the time of action.
DEFINITION 2.1.4 (Wilson, 1978) Acommunication system for coali-
tion $S$ is an $\# S$-tuple of algebras $\{A^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ on $T$ such that
$\forall j\in S:\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}}\subset A^{j}\subset \mathcal{T}^{S}$ .
It is $\wedge \mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ null, if $A^{\mathrm{j}}=\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}}$ for all $j\in S$ . It is called full, if $A^{j}=\mathcal{T}^{S}$ for aU
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2.2 Examples
EXAMPLE 2.2.1 ABayesian pure exchange economy is alist of specified
data,
$\mathcal{E}_{pe}:=(\{\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l},T^{j},u^{j},\dot{d}, \}_{j\in N}, \pi)$ ,
where $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is the consumption set, $T^{j}$ is the type space, $u^{j}:$. $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}\cross Tarrow \mathrm{R}$ is
the utility function, and $e^{j}$ : $T^{j}arrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is the initial endowment of consumer
$j\in N$ .
The associated Bayesian society,
$(\{C^{j},T^{j},u^{j}\}_{j\in N}, \{\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}, F^{S}\}_{S\epsilon N}, \pi)$ ,
is defined as follows: $N$ , $T^{j}$ , $u^{j}$ and $\pi$ are given in economy $\mathcal{E}_{p\mathrm{e}}$ .
$C^{j}$ $:=\mathrm{R}_{+}^{1}$ ,
$F^{S}(\overline{x})$ $:=$ $\{x^{S}$ : $T arrow C^{S}|\forall t:\sum_{j\in S}x^{j}(t)\leq\sum_{j\in S}e^{j}(t^{j})x^{S}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathcal{T}^{S}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e},\}$ .
Some works (e.g., Hahn and Yannelis (1997), Vohra (1999) and Yazar
(2001) $)$ $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$-formulate the model so that $j’ \mathrm{s}$ stratey is an excess demand
plan, $z^{\mathrm{j}}$ : $t\vdash*x^{j}(t)-e^{\mathrm{j}}(t^{\mathrm{j}})$ . Demand plan $x^{j}$ is $\mathcal{T}^{S}$-measurable iff excess
demand plan $z^{j}$ is $\mathcal{T}^{S}$-measurable. But choice of demand plan versus $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\square$
demand plan as astrategy affects some results.
EXAMPLE 2.2.2 ABayesian coalition production economy is a1st of
specified data,
$\mathcal{E}_{\varphi}:=(\{\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l},T^{j},u^{j}, e^{\dot{f}}\}_{j\in N}$ , $\pi$ , $\{\mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{S}}\}_{S\in N}$).
The associated Bayesian society,
$(\{C^{j},T^{j},u^{j}\}_{j\in N}, \{\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}, F^{S}\}_{S\in N}, \pi)$ ,
is defined as follows: $N$ , $T^{j}$ , $u^{j}$ and $\pi$ are given in economy $\mathcal{E}_{\varphi}$ .
$C^{j}$ $:=\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ ,
$F^{S}(\overline{x})$ $:=$ $\{x^{S}$ : $T arrow C^{S}|\forall t\in.T.\cdot y(t)\in \mathrm{Y}^{S}(t)X^{S}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathcal{T}^{s_{-\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e}_{S}}}\exists y.Tarrow \mathrm{R}^{l},\mathcal{T}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a},\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e}\sum_{j\in \mathrm{S}}x^{j}(t)\leq y(t)+\sum_{j\in}^{s_{-\mathrm{m}}’}\dot{d}(t^{j})’\}$.
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EXAMPLE 2.2.3 Chandler’s (1962) firm in mnltidivisional form (M-form
firms) is formulated as aparticular instance of the Bayesian coalition $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\sim$
duction economy, which has amore specific structure (to be specified in
subsection 3.2.1). Here, distinction of amarketed commodity and anomnar-
keted commodity is essential: While the former has aprice establshed in the
market outside the ffim, the latter is produced or traded only for internal
use, so does not have aprice. Various technological states are considered the
possible types of each division. Define
$N$:profit-centers (semiautonomous decisionmakers) in the M-
form firm.
$k_{m}:\#$ of the marketed commodities.
4: $\#$ of the nomnarketed commodities.
$r^{j}$ : $T^{j}arrow \mathrm{R}^{h}$ : the resource function.
Aprofit center game with incomplete information of Ichiishi and Radner
(1999) is alist of specified data $V$ $:=(\mathcal{E}_{\varphi},p)$ of Bayesian coalition production
economy $\mathcal{E}_{\varphi}$ and price vector $p$ for the marketed commodities. Here,
$\mathcal{E}_{\varphi}$ $:=$ ($\{\mathrm{R}^{k_{m}+h},T^{j}$ , profit function, $r^{\mathrm{j}}\}_{\mathrm{j}\in N}$ , $\{\tau\dot{p}\}_{j\in N}$ , $\{\mathrm{Y}^{j}\}_{j\in N}$),
$p$ $\in$ $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{k_{m}}$ ,
so the $ex$ ante probabilty on $T$ is the product probability of $\pi^{j}$ ’s.
The technology of each division, which determines the production set
$\mathrm{Y}^{j}(t)$ is embodied in its assets (resource $r^{\mathrm{j}}(t)$);this fact is called the asset
specificity. Therefore, it makes sense to postulate that $r^{\mathrm{j}}(\cdot)$ is 1-1 on $T^{j}$ .
Atransfer payment problem is how to determine prices of nonmarketed
commodities transferred from one division to another. The cooperative game
played by the divisions determines these prices. $\square$
2.3 Measurability as afeasibility requirement
Suppose that the grand coalition $N$ is entertaining astrategy bundle $\overline{x}$ : $Tarrow$
$C$ , but that $S$ may defect and take $x^{S}$ : $Tarrow C^{S}$ . The following condition
says that player cannot take different actions contigent on two type profiles
which he cannot discern
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CONDITION 2.3.1 (Radner, 1967) Suppose that communication sys-
tem $\{A^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ will be available at the time of action (strategy execution).
Then, members of $S$ can take only those strategies $x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})$ such that $x^{j}$
is $A^{j}$-measurable for every $j\in S$ .
The private information case is defined as the situation in which the
null communication system $\{\mathcal{T}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ is available at the time of action. In
accordance with the private information case, Yannelis (1991) introduced
the private measurability condition on strategies that $j’ \mathrm{s}$ strategy $x^{j}$ be $\mathcal{T}^{j_{-}}$
measurable for every $j\in S$ . Define
$F^{\prime S}(\overline{x}):=\{x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})|\dot{d}$ is $\mathcal{T}^{j}$-meaeurable for all $j\in S\}$ .
2.4 Bayesian incentive compatibility
2.4.1 Private information case
We present the other basic requirement (Bayesian incentive compatibilty)
for the private information case first. Suppose that the grand coalition $N$ is
entertaining astrategy bundle $\overline{x}$ : $Tarrow C$, but that $S$ may defect and take
$x^{S}$ : $Tarrow C^{S}$ . Let $\{\overline{t}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ be $5’ \mathrm{s}$ true type profile.
If player $j$ takes honest action $x^{j}(\overline{t}^{j})$ , his conditional expected utility at
that time (i.e., given $\overline{t}^{j}$ ) is
$Eu^{j}..(x^{S}, \overline{x}^{N\backslash s}=\sum_{\in t^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}T^{N\backslash \{j\}}}^{1\overline{t}^{j})}u^{j}(x^{j}(\overline{t}^{j}),x^{S\backslash \{j\}}(t^{S\backslash \{j\}}),\overline{x}^{N\backslash s}(t^{N\backslash s}),$ $(\overline{t}^{j},t^{N\backslash \{j\}}))\pi(t^{N\backslash \{j\}}|\overline{t}^{j})$ .
If, on the other hand, he takes awrong action $\dot{d}\in x^{\mathrm{j}}(T^{j})\backslash \{x^{\mathrm{j}}(\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})\}$, then,
assuming the others’ honest action, his conditional expected utility $\dot{\Psi}^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\overline{\dot{P}}}$
becomes
$Eu^{j}.$
. $( \dot{d},x^{S\backslash \{j\}},\overline{x}^{N\backslash S}=\sum_{\in t^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}T^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}}u^{\mathrm{j}}(c^{j},x^{S\backslash \{j\}}(t^{S\backslash \{j\}}),\overline{x}^{N\backslash S}(t^{N\backslash S})|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}}), (\overline{t}^{j},t^{N\backslash \{j\}}))\pi(t^{N\backslash \{j\}}|\overline{t}^{j})$.
For truthful execution of the plan, the members in $S$ agree only on astrategy
bundle such that taking awrong action is not worthwhile. Ichiishi and Idzik
(1996), whose first draft had been circulated since Summer 1991, introduced
the following Bayesian incentive compatibility condition to the Bayesian core
analysis (or more generally, to the Bayesian strong equilbrium analysis)
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CONDITION 2.4.1 (d’Aspremont and G\’erard-Varet, 1979) In the
private information case, members of $S$ agree only on those strategies $x^{S}\in$
$F^{\prime S}(\overline{x})$ that are Bayesian incentive-compatible, that is,
$\forall j\in S:\forall\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}}\in T^{j}$ : $\forall\dot{d}\in x^{j}(T^{j})$ :
$E\tau j(x^{S},\overline{x}^{N\backslash S}|t\dot{7})\geq E\tau\dot{d}(\dot{d},x^{S\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}},\overline{x}^{N\backslash S}|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})$ .
Define
$\hat{F}^{S}(\overline{x}):=$ {$x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})|x^{S}$ is Bayesian incentive-compatible.}.
Nonemptiness of the set $\hat{F}^{S}(\overline{x})$ is easily guaranteed. Indeed, if $x^{\mathrm{S}}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})$
is aconstant function, then $x^{S}\in\hat{F}^{\mathrm{S}}(\overline{x})$ .
Within the framework of Bayesian pure exchange economy, in which an
excess demand plan is astrategy, Hahn and Yannels observed that private
measurability implies Bayesian incentive compatibility.
PROPOSITION 2.4.2 (Hahn and Yannelis, 1997) Let $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ be a Bayes-
ian pure exchange economy in the private information case, in which player
$j’ s$ strategy is $j’ s$ excess demand plan $z^{\mathrm{j}}$ , and the coalitional feasibility is
defined by the exact equality,
$\forall t\in T:\sum_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{S}}z^{\mathrm{j}}(t)=0$
.
Then, private measurability implies Bayesian incentive compatibility.
This proposition is no longer valid if ademand plan $x^{j}$ is used as a
strategy, as the following example shows:
EXAMPLE 2.4.3 Consider the Bayesian pure exchange economy with one
commodity $(l =1)$ , two types for each consumer $(T^{j}=\{a^{j},b^{\mathrm{i}}\})$ , and risk-
neutral utlity function $(u^{j}(\dot{d},t)=\dot{d})$ , and suppose that the initial endow-
ment is given as
$\dot{d}(t^{j})=\{$
1, if $t^{j}=a^{\mathrm{j}}$ ,
2, if $t^{j}=b^{j}$ .
Then the initial endowment bundle $e$ is attainable with equality in $N$ and
satisfies measurabilty. But
$Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(\dot{d}(\dot{U})|a^{j})=2>1$ $=Eu^{j}(\dot{d}|a^{\mathrm{j}})$ ,
so strategy $\dot{d}$ is not Bayesian incentive-compatible. $\square$
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Moreover, proposition 2.4.2 is not valid either in the general model of Bayesian
society $S$ .
REMARK 2.4.4 The revelation principle does not work here, that is, Bayes-
ian incentive compatibility cannot be assumed without loss of generality. To
see this point, consider example 2.4.3. The initial endowment bundle $e$ as
astrategy bundle satisfies feasibility with exact equality and private mea-
surabilty. Player $j’ \mathrm{s}$ best action is to always report $b^{j}$ . Let $\sigma^{j}$ : $t^{j}\vdash\neq\dot{\nu}$
the constant pretension function. The resulting strategy $e^{j}\mathrm{o}\sigma^{j}$ : $t^{j}\vdash*2$ is
private measurable and Bayesian incentive-compatible, yet it is not feasible.
2.4.2 Non-private information case
In an attempt to endogenously determine Wilson’s communications system
(definition 2.1.4), Yazar (2001) considered another cooperative game played
in the Bayesian pure exchange economy $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ . Each player $j’ \mathrm{s}$ strategy is a
pair $(z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{j})$ of anet trade plan $z^{j}$ : $Tarrow \mathrm{R}^{l}$ and acommunication plan $\mathrm{C}^{j}$
$(\subset \mathcal{T}^{j})$ . By choosing this strategy, he makes the information structure $\mathrm{C}^{j}$
available to everybody in his coalition. Choice of $\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ results in the
communication system $\{A^{j}\}_{j\in}s$ defined by $A^{j}:=\mathcal{T}^{j}\vee(\vee:\in s^{\mathrm{C}^{:})}\cdot$ The plan
$z^{j}$ is $\mathrm{v}_{:\in}{}_{S}\mathrm{C}^{:}$ -measurable. Denote by $C^{j}(t^{j})$ the minimal element of
$\mathrm{C}^{j}$ that
contains $t^{j}$ .
Suppose that the members of coalition $S$ have chosen strategy bundle
$\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ , and let $\overline{t}:=\{\overline{t}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ be the true type profile. Player $j$ knows
realzation of $E:=\{\overline{t}^{j}\}\cross T^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}$ . Suppose $j$ thinks that $t\in E$ occurred.
Assuming that his coleagues $i$ are sending information honestly through
the promised communication plan $\mathrm{C}^{i}$ , player $j$ receives the information that
event $\prod_{i\in S}C^{:}(t\cdot.)$ has occurred. By $\mathrm{v}_{:\in S}\mathrm{C}^{:}$-measurability, plan $z^{j}$ is constant
on $\Pi_{:\in s}C^{i}(t^{\dot{l}})$ . His conditional expected utility of the honest action given $\overline{t}^{j}$ ,
$Eu^{j}(z^{j}(t)+e^{j}(\overline{t}^{j})|\overline{t}^{j})$ is thus determined.
If player $j$ sends false information $C^{\prime j}\cross$ $T^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}\in \mathrm{C}^{j}$ , then (assuming that
his colleagues $i$ are sending information honestly) he receives the information
that event $E’:=C^{;j} \cross\prod_{:\in S\backslash \{j\}}C^{:}(t^{:})$ has occurred. Plan $z^{j}(t)$ is constant on
$E’$ . His conditional expected utilty of the wrong action given $\overline{t}^{j}$ , $Eu^{j}(z^{j}(E’)+$
$\dot{d}(\overline{t}^{j})|\overline{t}^{j})$ is thus determined. Yazar’s Bayesian incentive compatibility
condition guarantees that $j’ \mathrm{s}$ offer of communication plan $\mathrm{C}^{j}$ to his colleagues
is credible, and that $j$ acts honestly
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DEFINITION 2-4.5 (Yazar, 2001) Coalition $S$’s strategy bundle $\{z^{j}$ ,
$\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ in the Bayesian pure exchange economy is Bayesian incentive-compat-
ible, in the sense that
$\urcorner\exists j\in S:\exists\overline{t}^{j}\in T^{j}$ : $\exists C’\in \mathrm{C}^{j}$ : $\forall t\in\{\overline{\dot{\nu}}\}\cross T^{N\backslash \{j\}}$ :
$E\tau j(z^{j}(E’)+\dot{d}(\dot{P})|\overline{t}^{i})>E\tau j(z^{j}(t)+\dot{d}(\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})|\overline{t}^{j})$ .
where $E’:=C’\cross\Pi_{:\epsilon s\backslash \{j\}}C.\cdot(t^{:})$.
We present Vohra’s (1999) mediator-based approach to $\mathcal{E}_{\mu}$ . The role of a
mediator is essentially to remove the need for private measurabilty. Here is
the scenario:
1. $S$ daeigns $z^{S}+e^{S}\in F^{S}$ . Notice $\mathcal{T}^{S}-\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ of each $z^{\mathrm{j}}$ (rather
than $\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}}$-measurabilty).
2. Player $j$ confidentially reports $t^{j}$ to the mediator.
3. The mediator has reports $t^{S}$ .
4. The mediator tells $j$ to make choice $z^{j}(t^{S})$ .
Let $\overline{t}^{S}$ be the true type profile. Honest report in stage 2gives him the
conditional expected utility, $Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(z^{\mathrm{j}}+e^{\mathrm{j}}|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})$ . On the other hand, dis-
honaet report of $\overline{t}^{j}$ in stage 2 $\dot{y}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ him the $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ expected utility,
$Eu^{j}(z^{j}(\overline{t}^{j}, \cdot)+e^{j}|\overline{t}^{j})$. The mediator is simply an enforcement agency; he
does not know the true type profile. So the members of coalition $S$ designs
a plan $z^{S}$ in stage 1 which induces honest report in stage 2.
DEFINITION 2.4.6 (Vohra, 1999) $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{y}}$ bundle $z^{S}\in F^{S}-\{e^{S}\}$ is
Bayesian incentive-co mpatible, in the sense that
$\neg\exists j\in S:\exists\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}}$ : $\exists\overline{t}^{j}$ :
$E\tau\dot{d}(z^{j}(\tilde{t}^{\mathrm{j}}, \cdot)+\dot{d}|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})>E\tau j(z^{j}+e^{j}|\overline{t}^{j})$.
In spirit, Yazar’s strategy with the full communication plan $(z^{\mathrm{j}}, \mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}})$ is
identical to Vohra’s strategy $z^{\mathrm{j}}$ (although the detailed formulation is differ-
ent). Thus, Yazar’s model may be considered an extension of Vohra’s model;
the former ffiows for an arbitrary communication plan.
To assume presence of amediator is astep badcward, since there is no
mediator in reah.ty. We present $\mathrm{m}$ altemative scenario for Vohra’s approach;
it is intended to eliminate the mediator.
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1. $S$ designs $z^{S}+e^{S}\in F^{S}$ .
2. Players independently and simultaneously report
$t^{j}$ ’s each other.
3. The players have updated information $t^{S}$ .
4. Player $j$ makes the promised choice $z^{j}(t^{S})$ , using the full communication
plan.
There is avital problem about this scenario: In stage 2, decision is made
at the interim stage in which player has only the interim conditional prob-
abih.ty $\pi^{j}(\cdot|\overline{t}^{j})$ given his true type $\overline{t}^{j}$ . At this time he has not made action
yet. In stage 4, decision is made at the $ex$ post stage in which player knows
the information $\overline{t}^{S}$ . Upon receiving asharper information in stage 4, he may
realize that his decision in stage 2turns out to be suboptimal. This problem
is illustrated in the following example.
EXAMPLE 2.4,7 Consider the Bayesian pure exdtange economy, given
by $l$ $=1$ , $\# N$ $=\# Tj$ $=2$ , $e^{j}(t^{j})=1$ , $u^{j}(\dot{d},t)=\dot{d}$ , $\pi(t)=1/4$ for all
$t$ . Consider the plan $z^{N}:=\{(z^{1}(t), z^{2}(t))\}_{t\in T}\in F^{N}-\{e^{N}\}$ given in the
folowing table:
This strategy satisfies Vohra’s Bayesian incentive compatibility (condition
2.4.6). Let $\overline{t}$ be any true $\mathrm{t}\mathfrak{M}\mathrm{e}$ profile, say $\overline{t}=(t_{1}^{1},t_{1}^{2})$ . In stage 4, consumer
1 regrets his report in stage 2, breaks off from the coaltion, taking back $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\square$
initial endowment.
The mediator-based approach without amediator thus postulates acor-
porate (coalitional) atmosphere which forces its members to always act ac-
cording to an agreed upon strategy bundle. It is this invisible enforcement
atmosphere that we label as the “mediator.” In reality, however, the effec-
tiveness of this kind of mediator is questionable.
The private information case, together with the associated private mea-
surabilty condition, postulates the safe attitude of each coalition that it
avoids to design those mechanisms that could make its member reluctant to
act at the time of contract execution
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2.5 Descriptive solution concepts
Most works in this area postulated that each player plays both the role of
principal and the role of agent: Players get together to make coordinated
strategy choice as principals. They decide on their self-sustaining strategy
bundles (descriptive solution of the game). Each player execute his agreed
strategy as an agent in the $inter\dot{\tau}m$ period. The solution is called $ex$ ante
(interim, resp.), if it is agreed upon in the $ex$ ante period (in an interim
period, resp.). The theory intends to endogenously determine amechanism
(solution) without amediator.
2.5.1 Interim solution concepts
Given Bayesian pure exchange economy $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ and any $E\subset T$, define
$F_{E}^{S}:=\{x^{S}$ : $Earrow \mathrm{R}^{l\cdot\# S}$ $\forall t\in E:\sum_{j\in S}x^{j}(t)=\sum_{\mathrm{j}\in S}\dot{d}(t)\}$ .
In the ffist solution concept, players use only of the null communication
system. It is easy to incorporate private measurability and Bayesian incentive
compatibility in this solution concept.
DEFINITION 2.5.1 (Wilson, 1978) Acommodity allocation plan $x^{*}$ is
said to be in the coarse core of $\mathcal{E}_{p\mathrm{e}}$ , if
(i) $x^{*}\in F_{T}^{N}$ ;and
(ii) it is not true that
$\exists$ $S \in N:\exists E\in\bigwedge_{\mathrm{j}\in S}\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}}$ : $\exists x^{S}\in F_{E}^{S}$ : $\forall j\in S:\forall t\in E$ :
$Eu^{j}(x^{j}|\mathcal{T}^{j})(t)>Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(x^{*j}|\mathcal{T}^{j})(t)$ .
In the present extreme case ($\mathcal{T}.\cdot\wedge \mathcal{T}^{j}=\{\emptyset,T\}$ if $i\neq j$), condition (\"u)
becomes:
$\neg\exists j\in N:\exists t^{\mathrm{j}}\in T^{j}$ : $\exists x^{j}\in F_{\{\rangle \mathrm{x}T^{N\backslash \{\mathrm{j}\}}}^{j}t^{j}$ :
$Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(x^{j}|t^{j})>Eu^{j}(x^{*_{\backslash }\mathrm{j}}|t^{j})$ ,
$\neg$ $(\exists S:\# S \geq 2)$ : $\exists x^{S}\in F_{T}^{S}$ : $\forall j\in S:\forall t^{j}\in T^{\mathrm{j}}$ :
$E\tau\dot{d}(x^{j}|t^{\mathrm{j}})>Eu^{j}(x^{*j}|t^{\mathrm{j}})$ .
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Notice the subtle difference ffom the $ex$ ante coalitional stability condition,
$\neg\exists S$ : $\exists x^{S}\in F_{T}^{S}$ ; $\forall j\in S:\forall t^{j}\in T^{j}$ : $Eu^{j}(x^{j}|t^{j})>Eu^{j}(x^{*j}|t^{j})$ .
In the second solution, players are given aset of feasible communication
systems, and use them in determining their strategy bundle.
DEFINITION 2,5.2 (Wilson, 1978) Acommodity allocation plan $x^{*}$ is
said to be in the fine core of $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ with families $C(S)$ of feasible communication
systems, $S\in N$, if
(i) $x^{*}\in F_{T}^{N}$ ;and
(ii) if it is not true that
$\exists S\in N:\exists\{A^{j}\}_{j\in S}\in C(S)$ : $\exists E\in\bigwedge_{j\in S}A^{j}$ :
$\exists$ $x^{S}\in F_{E}^{S}$ : $\forall j\in S:\forall t\in E$
$Eu^{j}(x^{j}|A^{j})(t)>Eu^{j}(x^{*j}|A^{j})(t)$ .
Here, $C(S)\ni \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ full communication system.
Wilson left open the important question: to clarify the process according
to which the members of coalition $S$ come to be endowed with communication
systems $C(S)$ . Since $C(S)$ contains the full communication system, condition
(ii) for the fine core includes:
$\neg\exists S\in N$ : $\exists t^{S}\in T^{S}$ : $\exists$ $x^{S}\in F_{\{t^{S}\}\mathrm{x}T^{N\backslash S}}^{S}$ :
$\forall j\in S$ : $Eu^{j}(x^{j}|t^{S})>Eu^{j}(x^{*j}|t^{S})$ .
Notice the asymmetry in the grand coalition and the blodcing coaltion
in this condition; while the grand coalition needs to design achoice bundle
for every possible type profile, the blocking coalition $S$ needs only to make
achoice given $t^{S}$ . If we remove this asymmetry and incorporate the two
basic requirements on the strategy, private measurability and Bayesian in-
centive compatibility, we obtain the interim Bayesian incentive-compatible
core concept. Because of its importance, we present the concept extended to
the Bayesian society
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DEFINITION 2.5.3 Let $S$ be Bayesian society in the private information
case. Astrategy bundle $x^{*}\in X$ is called an interim Bayesian $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\triangleright$
compatible strong equilibrium, if
(i) $x^{*}\in\hat{F}^{N}(x^{*})$;and
(ii) it is not true that
$\exists S\in N$ : $\exists t^{S}\in T^{S}$ : $\exists x^{S}\in\hat{F}^{S}(x^{*}.)$ :
$\forall j\in S:Eu^{j}(x^{S},x^{*N\backslash S}|t^{j})>Eu^{j}(x^{*}|t^{\mathrm{j}})$ .
Avery specific instance of this concept was used in Ichiishi and SertePs
(1998) study of aprofit-center game. No general existence theorem has been
establshed for the interim Bayesian incentive- ompatible strong equilibrium.
For completeness, we present asolution concept based on the mediator-
based approach to the Bayesian pure exdtange economy. Define for each
$E\in \mathcal{T}^{S}$ :
$\dot{P}_{E}^{\mathrm{c},S}:=\{x^{S}\in F_{E}^{S}$
$x^{S}$ is $\mathcal{T}^{S}$-measurable, and
$\forall j\in S$ : $x^{j}-\dot{d}$ is Bayesian $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\triangleright$ $\}$ .
compatible (condition 2.4.6).
DEFINITION 2-5-4 (Vohra, 1999) Acommodity allocation plan $z^{*}$ is
said to be in the coarse core of $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ , if
(i) $z^{*}\in\dot{P}_{T}^{\mathrm{c},N}-\{e^{N}\}$ ;and
(ii) if it is not true that there exist $S\in N$, $E \in\bigwedge_{j\in S}\mathcal{T}^{j}$ , and $z^{S}\in F_{E}^{\mathrm{q}S}-\{e^{S}\}$
such that
$\forall j\in S:\forall t\in E$ :
$Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(z^{\mathrm{j}}+\dot{d}|\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}})(t)>Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(x^{*j}+\dot{d}|\mathcal{T}^{j})(t)$.
2.5.2 $Ex$ ante solution concepts
We turn to $ex$ ante solution concepts. For Bayesian pure exchange economy
$\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ , define:
$F^{\prime S}:=\{x^{S}$ : $Tarrow \mathrm{R}^{l\cdot*S}$
$x^{\mathrm{j}}$ is $\mathcal{T}^{j}$-measurable,$\forall t.\cdot\sum_{j\in S}.x^{j}(t)\leq\sum_{j\in S}\dot{d}(t)\forall j\in S.\}$ .
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DEFINITION $2,5_{-}5$ (Yannelis, 1991) Acommodity allocation plan $x^{*}$
is called private information core allocation of $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ in the private information
case, if
(i) $x^{*}\in F^{\prime N}$ :and
(ii) it is not true that
$\exists S\in N$ : $\exists x^{S}\in F^{\prime S}$ : $\forall j\in S$ :
$Eu^{j}(x^{j})>Eu^{j}(x^{*j})$ ,
where $Eu^{j}(x^{\acute{J}})$ is the $ex$ ante expected utility of $x^{j}$ .
DEFINITION 2.5.6 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) Astrategy bundle $x^{*}\in$
$X$ of $S$ is called an $ex$ ante Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium,
if
(i) $x^{*}\in\hat{F}^{N}(x^{*})$ ;and
(ii) it is not true that
$\exists S\in N$ : $\exists x^{S}\in\hat{F}^{S}(x^{*})$ : $\forall j\in S$ :
$Eu^{j}(x^{S},x^{*N\backslash S})>Eu^{j}(x^{*})$ .
REMARK 2.5.7 In both the original definitions of the ex ante private
core (definition 2.5.5) and the $ex$ ante Bayesian incentive compatible strong
equilbrium (definition 2.5.6), the inequality in (ii) was replaced by:
$\forall t^{j}\in T^{j}$ : $Eu^{j}(x^{S},x^{*N\backslash S}|t^{\mathrm{j}})\geq Eu^{j}(x^{*}|t^{j})$ ,
with strict inequality for at least one $t^{\mathrm{j}}$ . The present condition (ii) is stronger.
The existence proofs of Yannelis (1991) and Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) actually
establish the existence of these stronger solutions. $\square$
Another interactive mode studied to date is amulti-principal, multi-agent
relationship. While there is no general theory of this mode, Ichiish $\mathrm{i}$ and
Koray (2000) studied aspecific model of education, aversion of Spence’
model. In their model, the first-stage game played by the principals have the





Wilson (1978) established acoarse core nonemptiness theorem, by applying
Scarf’s core nonemptiness theorem for balanced games (see, e.g., Scarf (1973,
theorem 8.3.6, p. 211)). In regard to emptiness of the fine core, Wilson
made the following observation on aspecific numerical example of $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ :By
considering the blodcing behavior of coalitions using the full communication
system, the initial endowment is shown to be the only candidate for an
unblocked allocation. But the initial endowment is blocked by the grand
coaltion using its null communication system. Yannelis (1991) establshed a
private core nonemptiness theorem for $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ .
THEOREM 3.1.1 (Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996) Let $S$ be a Bayesian s0-
ciety in the private information case. Assume:
(i) $C^{j}$ : a nonempty, compact, convex, and metrizable subset of a Hausdorff
locally convex topological vector space over $\mathrm{R}$;
(\"u) $u^{\mathrm{j}}(\cdot,t)$ :continuous and linear affine in $C^{\mathrm{j}}$;
(iii) $\mathrm{C}_{0}^{S}(t)j$ nonempty, closed and convex;
(iv) $F^{S}$ :both upper and lower semicontinuous in $X$, and has nonempty,
closed and convex values;
(v) for any $\overline{x}\in X$ and any balanced family $B$ with the associated balancing
coefficients $\{\lambda_{S}\}_{S\in B}$, it follows that
$\sum_{S\in B}\lambda_{S}\tilde{F}^{S}(\overline{x})\subset F^{N}(\overline{x})$ ,
where $F\sim_{\mathrm{S}(\overline{x}):=}\{x|x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x}), x^{N\backslash S}=0\}$;
(vi) either $F^{S}$ is a constant correspondence, or for any $\overline{x}\in X$ , $\theta\iota eoe$ nists
$\hat{x}^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})$ , such that for all $j\in S$ and all $t-\mathrm{j},\tilde{t}j\in T^{\mathrm{j}}$ for which $\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}}\neq\tilde{t}^{\mathrm{j}}$ ,
$Eu^{j}(\hat{x}^{j}|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})>Eu^{\mathrm{j}}(\hat{x}^{j}(\tilde{t}^{j})|\overline{t}^{\mathrm{j}})$ .
Then, there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium of $S$ .
The affine linmity condition (\"u) on $u^{j}(\cdot,t)$ means risk-neutralty, but
of course it is automatically satisfied if the players use mixed choices. It
is known to be crucial when Bayesian incentive compatibility is involve
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(the story is different for the pure exchange economy in the private informa-
tion case in which the players decide on excess demand plans as strategies).
Indeed, the main result of Vohra (1999) is an example of an empty mediator-
based Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core.
Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2000) studied the mediator-based Bayesian
pure exchange economy with correlated choices (probabilities on choice bun-
dles). While their ffamework cannot be directly included in the Bayesian
society (since no individualy taken strategy here, we can imbed it in acer-
tain Bayesian society. The imbedded model, while satisfying assumption
(ii) of theorem 3.1.1, does not satisfy assumption (v) of theorem 3.1.1. In-
deed, Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2000) provided an example which has no
Bayesian incentive compatible core allocation.
3.2 Approaches to information revelation
Each player $j$ is endowed with his private information structure $\mathcal{T}^{j}$ , so he
knows his true type $\overline{t}^{j}$ at the beginning of the interim period. By the time the
strategy execution is over, player $j$ will have narrowed down the range of his
colleague $i$ ’s possible true types to asubset $\mathrm{A}^{j}$. of $\dot{r}$ . In other words, while
the players start with the null communication system $\{\mathcal{T}^{j}\}_{j\in N}$ , they end
up with an endogenously determined finer communication system $\{A^{j}\}_{j\in N}$ .
This information revelation process is not easy to analyze, since aplayer $j$
may not want to pass on his private information to his colleagues, and even if
$j$ decides to do so, his colleagues may think that $j$ is not truthfully passing on
his information but is trying to manipulate them with false information. This
subsection $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ review two approaches taken in the literature for endogenous
determination of an information structure: passive information revelation
by action; and active information revelation by credible transmission of in-
formation (e.g., by credible talking). The ffist approach is classified into
two specific approaches: information revelation by contract execution, and
information revelation by choosing acontract.
3.2.1 By actions during the contract execution
This approach borrows the idea from the rational expectations equilibrium.
In order to see before and after the information processing, Ichiishi, Idzik and
Zhao’s (1994) constructed atw0-iygterivn-period model of Bayesian society $S$ .
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Let $C^{j}=C_{1}^{j}\cross C_{2}^{j}$ . Set $C_{k}^{j}$ is the choice set for interim period k $=1,$ 2. For
any function f : T $arrow Z$, let $A(f)$ be the smallest algebra that contains
$\{f^{-1}(z)|z\in Z\}$ .
POSTULATE 3.2.1 (Information-Revelation Process) Given any st-
rategy bundle $\overline{x}\in X$, coalition $S$ designs only those $x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})$ such that
for all $j\in S$
(i) $x_{1}^{j}$ is measurable with respect to $\mathcal{T}^{\mathrm{j}}$ , a $\mathrm{d}$
(\"u) $x_{2}^{J}$ is measurable with respect to $\mathcal{T}^{j}\vee A(x_{1}^{S})$ .
Denote by $F^{\prime S}(\overline{x})$ the set of $x^{S}\in F^{S}(\overline{x})$ that satisfy the information-
revelation process (postulate 3.2.1). We can define Bayesian incentive com-
patibility in this tw0-period framework, although precise definition is alittle
involved. Denote by $\hat{F}^{S}(\overline{x})$ the set of $x^{S}\in F^{\prime S}(\overline{x})$ that satisfy Bayesian
incentive compatibility.
Define an $ex$ ante Bayesian incentive-compatible strong equilibrium of $S$
using correspondences $\hat{F}^{S}$ as in definition 2.5.6.
ABayesian society studied here is aspecified list of data,
$S:=(\{C^{j},T^{\mathrm{j}},\mathrm{z}\ell^{j}\}_{j\in N}, \{C_{0}^{\mathrm{S}}, F^{S}\}_{S\in N}, \pi)$ .
Fix $(\{C^{\mathrm{j}},T^{j},u^{\mathrm{j}}\}\mathrm{j}\in N, \{C_{0}^{S}\}s\epsilon N, \pi)$ , and $\mathrm{v}\Re \mathrm{y}$ $\{F^{S}\}s\epsilon N$ . We then have
different Bayesian societies, hence the space of Bayesian societies. Endow
$\mathrm{S}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}}$ with anatural pseud0-metric $d$. The folowing ageneric existence
theorem for full-information revealing Bayesian incentive compatible strong
equilibrium.
THEOREM 3.2.2 (Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao, 1994) There exists an
open and dense subset SPACEne of $SPACE_{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}}$ such that for each $S\in SPACE_{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}}$
there exist multitude of Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibria, and
there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium $x^{*}$ such that
$x_{1}^{*j}$ is 1-1 $\mathit{0}n$ $T^{j}$ .
Ichiishi and Radner (1999) studies information revelation problem within
the $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{o}- inter\dot{\tau}m$-period framework of profit-center game with incomplete in-
formation (example 2.2.3) $(\mathcal{E}_{\epsilon p},p)$ . They established exact existence theorems
for afull-information revealing Bayesian incentive compatible core strategy
of $(\mathcal{E}_{\varphi}, p)$ . Their three theorems postulate (1) aconvex technology, (2) a
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specific instance of increasing returns to scale, that is, astronger version
of Scarf’s (1986) distributiveness condition, and (3) for a $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\underline{\acute{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{c}$ supplier-
customer relationship among the divisions, respectively.
3.2.2 By choosing acontract
We present the idea of information revelation by choosing acontract. This
idea has been floating around the literature as afolklore; there is no explicit
written work. The point here is that agreeing or refusing to sign acontract
reveals private information. It applies to interim contracting in the private
information case. We $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ see the idea by two examples. Both examples are






$\pi^{i}(H^{i})=\pi^{:}(L^{:})=1/2$ for each $i\in S$ ,
and the grand coaltion is deliberating on the constant strategy bundle $x$ :
$\forall j\in N$ : $\forall t$ $\in T:x^{j}(t)=1$ .
EXAMPLE 3.2.3 This example shows that coalition formation could be
made more difficult as aresult of the information revelation. Suppose that
$S$ finds the following strategy bundle $x^{\prime S}\in F^{S}(x)$ :
Then,
$\forall i\in S:E(x’\dot{.}|H^{i})=2>1$ $=E(x^{i}|H^{i})$ .
So $S$ can improve upon $x$ using $x^{\prime S}$ when the true $\mathrm{t}\mathfrak{M}\mathrm{e}$-profile is $\overline{t}^{S}=$
$(H^{1}, H^{2})$ .
However, player 1knows that player 2agrees to the joint strategy $x^{\prime S}$
only when 2’s true type is $H^{2}$ , since
$E(x^{O}|L^{2})=0<1$ $=E(x^{2}|L^{2})$ .
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Then player 2’s agreement to $x^{\prime S}$ reveals the information to player 1that 2’s
true type is $H^{2}$ . Given this information, player 1does not agree to $d^{S}$ since
$x^{\prime 1}(t^{1}, H^{2})=0<1$ $=x^{1}(t^{1},H^{2})$ , for $t^{1}=H^{1},L^{1}$ .
Thus, stratey $x^{\prime \mathrm{S}}$ cannot serve as aublo&ing strategy against $x^{S}$ . $\square$
EXAMPLE 3.2.4 This example shows that coalition formation could be
made easier as aresult of the information revelation. Suppose that $S$ finds
the following strategy bundle $d^{\prime S}\in F^{S}(x)$ :
Then,
$E(x^{\prime\prime 1}|H^{1})=E(x^{\prime\prime 1}|L^{1})=0.75$
$<$ $1=E(x^{1}|H^{1})=E(x^{1}| L^{1})$ .
So $S$ cannot improve upon $x$ us\’ing $d^{\prime S}$ according to the traditional “blocking”
criterion. However, when the true type profile is $\overline{t}^{S}=(H^{1},H^{2})$ , player 2
wants to agree to the joint strategy $d^{\prime S}$ . When this happens, player 1infers
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}2\mathrm{e}$
’s true type is $H^{2}$ , so 1also wants to agree to $x^{\prime\prime S}$ . Thus, strategy
$x_{\square }^{\prime\prime S}$
serves as a“blo&ing strategy against $x^{S}$ .
This kind of information revelation occurs within a“blocking” coalition.
The scenario does not address how the private information is revealed only
through the original strategy bundle $x$ of the grand coaltion $N$. In particular,
given strong equilibrium strategy bundle (or acore strategy bundle) $x^{*}$ , this
kind of information revelation does not occur, since there are no “blocking”
coalitions.
3.2.3 By credible information-transmission (e.g., by credible talk-
ing) at the contract negotiation
We will see how the mediator-based approach, with all its problematic na-
ture, has provided an idea about endogenous determination of acommuni-
cation system. Recall Yazar’s (2001) formulation of astrategy in $\mathcal{E}_{pe}$ and her
Bayesian incentive compatibility condition (condition 2.4.5). Defin
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$\hat{F}^{S}:=\{\{z^{\acute{J}},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$
$\forall$ j $\in S$ : $z^{\mathrm{j}}$ is $\mathrm{v}_{:\in S}\mathrm{C}^{i}$-measurable,
$\mathrm{C}^{\acute{J}}\subset \mathcal{T}^{j}\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}$’is Bayesian $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\}$ .
$\forall$ t : $\sum_{j\in S}z^{j}(t)$ $=0$
Astrategy bundle $\{z^{*j},\mathrm{C}^{*j}\}_{j\in N}$ of the grand coalition in $\mathcal{E}_{p\epsilon}$ is said to be
in the $EC$-core(endogenous communication plan core), if (i) $\{z^{*j},\mathrm{C}^{*j}\}j\in N\in$
$\hat{F}^{N}$ , and (ii) if it is not true that
$\exists S\in N$ : $\exists\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{\acute{J}}\}_{j\in S}\in\hat{F}^{S}$ :
$\forall ij\in S$ : $Eu^{j}(z^{j}+\dot{d})>Eu^{j}(z^{*j}+\dot{d})$ .
The communication system $\{A^{*j}\}_{\mathrm{j}\in N}$ , $A^{*j}:=\mathcal{T}^{j}\vee(\mathrm{y}_{:\in}{}_{N}\mathrm{C}^{*:})$ , sustains as
aresult of credible talk at the contract negotiation.
The following lemma is the key step in Yazar’s result:
LEMMA 3-2-5 (Yazar, 2001) For any coalition $S\in N$, let $\{\mathrm{C}^{j}\}j\in S$
and $\{\mathrm{C}^{\prime j}\}_{j\in S}$ be two communication plan bundles, and let $\{z^{j}\}_{j\in S}$ be a net
trade bundle. If $\mathrm{C}^{\prime_{\acute{J}}}\subset \mathrm{C}^{j}$ for every $\acute{J}\in S$ and if $\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{\prime j}\}_{j\in S}\in\hat{F}^{S}$ , then
$\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in S}\in\hat{F}^{S}$ .
THEOREM 3-2-6 (Yazar, 2001) Let $\{\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in N}$ and $\{\mathrm{C}^{\prime\acute{g}}\}_{\mathrm{j}\in N}$ be two corn-
munication plan bundles, and let $\{z^{\mathrm{j}}\}_{j\in N}$ be a net trade bundle for the grand
coalition. If $\mathrm{C}^{\prime j}\subset \mathrm{C}^{j}$ for ever$ryj\in N$ and if $\{z^{j},\mathrm{C}^{\prime j}\}_{j\in N}$ is in the EC-core,
then $\{z^{\mathrm{j}},\mathrm{C}^{j}\}_{j\in N}$ is also in the EC-core.
In particular, if the $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{C}$-core is nonempty at all, then there exists astrat-
egy bundle in the $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{C}$-core which gives rise to the full commuication system.
For the special case in which each utility function $u^{j}(\cdot,t)$ is affine lnear
on the consumption set $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ , Yazar (2001) also established nonemptiness of
the EC-core.
For Vohra’s Bayesian incentive compatibility (condition 2.4.6) $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\underline{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ to
an arbitrary communication plan, the analogue of Yazar’s lemma is triviall
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